

Leslie Farber “The ways of the will”

Lying on the couch

p.10 And where is meaning found? It is found in the search for truth – about what one has been and done, about what one is and is doing.

I think that speaking truthfully is a more fitting ambition than speaking the truth.

Tiesa visada dalinė, niekada nepilna. Visada reikalaujanti pastangų, vargo, niekada – išlaisvinanti, nudžiuginanti.

Kai meluoja. Nenorėdamas sakyti tiesos. Prisiderini prie terapinės pasaulėžiūros. Dramatizuoji. Tiesa dalinė, nesukelianti daug emocijų. Duodanti truputį, neduodanti kažkokio didelio išsivadavimo.

p. 18 Kai ryšys netenka prasmės, jis tampa pažeidžiamas apgaulei, nes pripažinti meaninglessness yra sunkiau nei deceit.

p.19 man is a creature who can speak truthfully and who can lie

p.20 The feeling of truth-telling.

Schizophrenia and the mad therapist

p.29 Believability is central to the effectiveness of the performance, but in order that it be achieved, actual personal sincerity – in regard to the scene itself – is unnecessary, if not irrelevant. In therapeutic encounters, on the other hand, the therapist’s actual personal sincerity is considered absolutely essential to the occasion.

Čia taip gerai užkabino. Galvoju apie Saulę – kiek vaidinu rolę mylinčio ir kiek iš tikrųjų myliu. Kiek vaidinu norintį bučiuotis ir mylėtis ir kiek iš tikrųjų noriu. Ir apie Rūtą. Kiek norėjau parašyti, o kiek tiesiog jutau, kad geras terapeutas Timas parašytų?

p.32 Kierkegaard. The worst of all despairs is the one in which one does not know he is in despair. Despair skatina klausti tragiškus ir sunkius klausimus apie gyvenimą ir jo prasmę. Jei despair nuneigiama – neklausama.

p.34 Terapeutas, siekdamas prisijungti prie paciento, gali paryškinti momentus, kai jis pats jautėsi svetimas, atstumtas ir gali įtikėti tuo pasakojimu.

p.36 The realm of causation is a treacherous ground for a man interested in the truth about himself. <...> an absorption with the role of causation in human affairs may lead to a habitual reduction of any human event to its postulated cause. It is apparent how such reduction promises refuge to a man beset by necessity to „confess“: once he turns his attention to cause, his personal responsibility (whether he acknowledges it or not) is diminished, along with any undue stress or discomfort he may have felt in facing what he believes to be his absolute worst.

p.38 Schizophrenia is a disorder with double failure: meaning and relation.

Terapeutai pradeda šizofrenikus laikyti tarsi orakulais, kurie permato kasdienybės melą ir yra tiesos nešėjai. Dėl to terapeutams darbas su šizofrenikais tampa daug patrauklesnis nei buvimas kasdieniame mele.

Taip pat nutolstama nuo kalbos. Kalba suvokiama kaip įrankis apgaulei. Nuskursta ji, tampa panaši į fizinius gestus.

Galiausiai terapeutas ir pats patiki, kad jis orakulas. Tik gražiau apsirengęs ir geriau socialiai prisitaikęs.

p.43 the schizophrenic's muteness may become and remain a willful refusal to talk, in response to what he regards as the demand to talk being made on him by those about him. Reduced to his own will, the schizophrenic perceives himself as continually assailed by the willful demands of others.

p.44 **Relation, understood in any decent sense, cannot be willed: it happens or it doesn't happen, depending on what human qualities are brought to the event: honesty, imagination, tact, humour, and so on. By contrast, the willful encounter – a far cry from the chancy and fleeting mutuality that occurs from time to time between people, and have a special binge-like excitement, even though its center is hollow. Its intensity is of the moment; unlike friendship, when the moment vanishes, little remains.** (Kuo skiriasi tikras ryšys ir terapinis binge-like. Tikras sukuriamas be valios pastangų? O kai susitinka dvi valios, tada ryšio nebus?)

H. Stack Sullivan and the American Dream

p.61 "Indirect reassurance" is a form of deception, or conning, to be contrasted with Martin Buber's "confirmation", which is an open – though not necessarily literal or explicit – acknowledgement of the patient's particularity, so far as his thinking, feeling, perceiving can be imagined and expressed.

p.62 Buber. Human truth, he wrote, is conceived in, and discovered in, dialogue. Dialogue is the realm of transcendence that remains quintessentially human – and within the grasp, potentially, of any human being who can speak and listen.

p.63 The concept of talk between two people as a mutual construct of impressions and ideas, spacious and open-ended, full of surprise and discovery, steering as best it can in the general direction (it hopes) of truth

Thinking about will

p.77 I understand will to be the category through which we examine that portion of our life which is the mover of our life in a direction or toward an objective in time. (valia kaip mūsų gyvenimo sudcedamoji dalis, kuri judina mūsų gyvenimą arba kreipia mus siekti tikslo).

Pirma valios rūšis – sąmoninga valia, kai žaidi tenisą ir tiesiog žaidžiasi. Judesys link krypties. Laimėti. Antra valios rūšis – sąmoninga, žaidi tenisą, nesiseka, tada galvoji kodėl. Judelis link objekto – reikia geriau padavimus daryti ir t.t. Antroji mažiau laisva ir labiau self-conscious. Trukdanti matyti plačiau, sutelkta į objektą.

p.78 Relation is always a dialogic potentiality.

p.79 Mūsų amžių Farberis vadina Age of Disordered Will, nes atrodo, jog ėmėme naudoti antros rūšies valią ten, kur turėtume naudoti pirmos.

I can will knowledge, but not wisdom; going to bed, but not sleeping; eating, but not hunger; reading, but not understanding.

Kai taikai antros rūšies valią ten kur turėtų būti pirmos – patiri nerimą.

p.80 Any marriage whose fate depends on technology is, at the very least, already a technological disaster.

p.83 Vitality of these moments depended on not being named or categorized

Will and anxiety

p.91 Will = responsible mover

p.92 kuo skiriasi will ir motive? Motive labiau deterministinis. Jei nuvertinu kaimyno pasiekimus iš pavydo, tai pavydas yra motyvas, kuris sukela pakibina mano valią nuvertinti. Tačiau valia labai arti pasirinkimo, laisvės. Aš galiu valioti ir nenuvertinti, kad ir pavydžiu. Žodžiu, causal determinizmas valią naikina, palikdamas motyvus, o tuo pačiu naikina ir paslaptį, pasirinkimą, atsakomybę? Ir tokia valia naikina situacijos tyrinėjimą. Vietoj klausimo *what* daug svarbesniu tampa *why*?

p.93 Anxiety is (Webster's) *painful uneasiness of mind over an impending or anticipated ill*.

p.95 in actuality it is rather difficult, if not impossible, to separate objective from subjective danger.

p.96 Anxiety is a painful state invoked by threat to human integrity.

p.103 Anxiety is that range of distress which attends willing what cannot be willed.

p.161 Apie talk between man and woman: So long as equality and honesty prevail, and so long as each person tries to imagine the other's reality without dishonoring his own. Jei tikras pokalbis gaunasi tarp vyro ir moters, tai jame slypi potencialias to confirm man as a man and woman as a woman.

p.177 Real talk of this order is a permanent state of bliss. <...> Early in relation both sex and talk give powerful help to the restoration of meaning when it has been lost. But as relation endures and the years pass, the balance between sex and talk shifts. Sex may still offer brief reconciliation, but unless meaning is restored through talk as well, the sexual consolation will become increasingly barren, even yielding to bitterness and despair. Language is now of the essence and real talk assumes a heavier obligation.

Real talk ne tik, kad patvirtita vyro vyriškumą ir moters moteriškumą, bet leidžia abiems likti sane.

About Jealousy

p.182 A man is cuckolded; a woman is unfortunate. The wife's infidelity strikes at her husband's honor and pride, it humiliates him. The husband's infidelity, however much it hurts his wife, need not humiliate or dishonor her; it reflects upon him rather than her, whereas hers also reflects upon him.

If virtue is its own reward, jealousy is its own punishment, though not, frequently, its only one.

p.186 Jealousy skiriasi nuo grief ir rage tuo, kad yra daug obsesyvesnė state. Obsession means being oppressed and besieged, as if by an evil spirit. Norisi, kad tokia obsession praeitų iš kitos pusės, būdamas pavydus tu vienu metu ir frenzied ir paralyzed.

p.193 'being-in-love' is strikingly similar to jealousy. The imperium of possession. And obsession.

p.194 Like jealousy (being-in-love), and all obsessions, it is addictive, requiring larger and larger doses of itself to satisfy the terms of its illusions.

On envy

p.238 Skill or tact or a capacity for honesty, for example, may be pursued directly; to acknowledge and enjoy possession of them doesn't contradict their nature. But, only the fool proclaims his wisdom, only the proud man his humility, only the coward, his courage. <...> Sharing an essential freedom from self-concern (which also characterizes the capacity for admiration), such virtues are not accomplishments and cannot be learned. They must be deserved, but their possession is a matter of grace, and is given only to him who denies it.

p.267 Meaninglessness is probably the most ultimately unendurable of the trials to which life may subject us.

Anne Farber "Afterword"

p.299 It has been said of Les that he was an example of Keats's 'negative capability' – „capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason“ in contrast to a man „who cannot feel he has a personal identity unless he has made up his mind about everything“.